A new NASA
report on the final moments of the seven astronauts killed during the 2003 Columbia
space shuttle tragedy is a vital safety tool for future spaceflyers and
spacecraft despite hitting close to home for the U.S. agency.
The 400-page
report released Tuesday gives
a detailed account of how Columbia's crew attempted to recover control of
the doomed shuttle on Feb. 1, 2003 as it broke apart high above Texas.
"This work,
we all hope, will go toward making spaceflight safer for all those who venture into
space in the future," said Wayne Hale, a former shuttle program manager who is
now NASA's deputy associate administrator for strategic partnerships, in a
teleconference with reporters. "This report confirms that although the valiant
Columbia crew tried every possible way to maintain control of their
vehicle, the accident was not ultimately survivable."
Columbia's
crew was killed in seconds and had only a brief 40-second period between the
shuttle's loss of control and its lethal depressurization in which to act, the
report stated.
A hard,
long look
A team of
NASA astronauts, engineers and pilots spent more than four years reconstructing
the Columbia crew's descent in the report, which is entitled the "Columbia Crew
Survival Investigation Report." Based on the study, the team found five
distinct lethal events during Columbia's descent and made 30 recommendations to
enhance astronaut safety and survivability in the event of a future catastrophic
failure.
But the report
also allowed some team members to work through the grief of their
lost comrades.
"I would
say this is one of the hardest things I've ever done technically and
emotionally," said NASA shuttle commander Pamela Melroy, deputy project manager
of the study team. "But it was so important and I felt sure that we needed
to make the best of all the knowledge we could get out of the action."
NASA
officials said the space agency released the report today, between the
Christmas and New Year's holidays, to give family members of the lost
Columbia crew time to discuss it with their children before the school year resumes
next month. Portions of the report were also redacted to respect the privacy of
Columbia's crew and families.
Columbia
broke apart on Feb. 1, 2003 while re-entering the Earth's atmosphere at the end
of a 16-day science mission in orbit. The spacecraft's vital heat shield was
damaged during its Jan. 16 launch, allowing superheated atmospheric gases to enter
a hole in the vehicle's left wing edge and lead to its destruction.
Returning
to Earth aboard Columbia that day were shuttle commander
Rick Husband, pilot Willie McCool, mission specialists Kalpana
Chawla, Laurel Clark, Michael Anderson, David Brown
and Ilan Ramon, Israel's first astronaut. Exposure to
high altitude and blunt trauma caused their deaths, the report confirmed.
Lessons
learned
Of the
recommendations stemming from the report, Hale said that one of the most immediate
safety changes incorporated into current space shuttles are inertial wheel lock
modifications on crew seats.
The
mechanism is designed to lock an astronauts seat restraints due to external
forces much like the seatbelt of a car locks during a sudden stop or impact,
Hale said. But during the Columbia accident, the restraints did not lock as
designed, subjecting the astronauts strapped in place to extreme forces and
trauma.
Seat
modifications will also be employed on NASA's new spacecraft, the
Orion crew capsule, to more fully integrate them into the cabin. While they
would not have saved Columbia's crew, they could save lives under a less severe
emergency, Hale said.
Launch and landing
pressure suits for Orion crews will also be designed to be sealed during
re-entry, said Jeff Hanley, manager of NASA's Constellation program overseeing
Orion's development. The current bright orange partial pressure suits seep pure
oxygen into a shuttle cabin when the visors are sealed, violating NASA's
flammability rules.
During
Columbia's descent, one crew member was not fully strapped into place. Another
did not have a helmet secured, while the six that did had their visors opened,
NASA's report concluded. Three of the crew members did not have their suit
gloves locked in place.
While
having the pressure suits fully donned would not have saved Columbia's crew, Melroy
said their status did merit changes in shuttle crew training protocols.
In addition
to modifying astronaut training to enhance a crew's ability to shift from
spacecraft recovery to survival, NASA has also updated prelanding milestones to
allow spaceflyers to focus on their own preparations in addition to getting an
orbiter ready for re-entry.
"The
emphasis on deorbit prep has always been on preparing the vehicle," said
Melroy, a three-time shuttle flyer. "There's an increased recognition of the
equal importance of configuring the crew equipment for entry."
The new
Columbia accident report is expected to be NASA's last investigation into the lost shuttle
flight, NASA officials said. While the report represents a chance for closure
for some at NASA, others hope it will shore up the foundation to avoid future
accidents.
"Spaceflight
takes eternal vigilance," said Hale. "Our goal here is to do our best to
prevent accidents in the future and that is not a subject that is ever going to
be closed."
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