"It's just yet another thing journalists now have to
take into account," said Kate Adie, a British Broadcasting Corp. radio
journalist awaiting assignment in Iraq.
In Qatar, Central Command spokeswoman Maj. Rumi
Nielson-Green said the U.S. military's focus is on structures and equipment --
not smaller targets such as individuals.
But she would not discuss the U.S. military's
capabilities and could not rule out the possibility that noncombatants could be
fired upon by mistake.
U.S. military officials have urged journalists and
other foreign civilians to leave Iraq for their own safety.
Iraq's Information Ministry estimates that 300
foreign journalists remain in Baghdad. That does not include those outside the
capital, whether traveling with U.S. forces or independently.
Major satellite telephony providers Inmarsat Ltd. of
London; Thuraya Satellite Telecommunications Co. of Abu Dhabi, United Arab
Emirates; and Iridium Satellite of Arlington, Virginia saw subscriptions and
usage rise alongside the prospect of a U.S. invasion.
On Tuesday, Inmarsat said it was activating a fifth
satellite to help ease congestion caused, in part, by transmissions of news
video.
If it wanted to ensure that it was not targeting
noncombatants, the U.S. military could ask satellite phone providers for help.
After all, the companies must locate subscribers to bill them.
But providers say their technologies aren't precise
enough to pinpoint a caller's location closer than a few miles (kilometers).
In the case of Iridium, chief technology officer Mark
Adams said the system can get no closer than an area the size of Arizona.
Thuraya's phones are tied to global positioning
technology and accurate to within 100 meters (yards). But company chairman
Mohammad Omran said subscribers must activate the GPS function on their phones
in order to be tracked.
That leaves the U.S. military, itself a major Iridium
client, to rely on eavesdropping or identifying unusual frequencies or call
patterns, analysts say.
Wayne Madsen, a former National Security Agency
analyst now with the Electronic Privacy Information Center, said U.S. spy
agencies listen to phone signals using satellites, aircraft, ground stations and
even specially equipped Humvees.
Processing those signals and making use of them is
more challenging.
Satellite calls generally carry some sort of
identification number, which gets matched to a phone number in company
databases. If U.S. intelligence officials can match the ID number to a person,
they can monitor the call _ assuming they can break any encryption used.
Eavesdroppers can also pinpoint a caller to within
several meters (yards) _ better than phone companies can. The process, called
triangulation, typically involves narrowing a signal's source by measuring its
intensity from at least three locations _ for instance, three surveillance
planes, or one making three passes.
But al-Qaida operatives haven't made it easy for U.S.
airborne snoops, and it's not likely Iraqi generals will, either.
Al-Qaida operatives change phones often and keep
calls short to discourage tracing, said intelligence expert and author James
Bamford. And phone IDs aren't always static. Iridium's changes with every call
to prevent fraud.
Even if a desired target is located, weapons may not
be marshaled in time.
You're going to have to move like greased
lightning,'' said Martin Streetly, editor of Jane's Electronic Mission Aircraft
in London. ``You are going to have the sequence of detection, identification and
then calling in a strike.