LAKE BUENA
VISTA, Fl. -- NASA's efforts to address foam debris issues with its shuttle
fuel tanks has proven an object lesson of how even the most diligent
spaceflight risk management efforts can fail, the agency's shuttle chief said
Wednesday.
Wayne Hale,
NASA's shuttle program manager, told about 400 risk experts, engineers and
managers that the loss of a one-pound
chunk of foam from a protuberance air load (PAL) ramp during the Discovery
orbiter's STS-114 launch was
not among the top risks expected for the mission before flight.
"Our
mistake was that we thought we understood the mechanism for foam loss," Hale
said here during NASA's Risk Management Conference 2005, adding that the PAL foam
fell well clear of Discovery. "We were lucky."
The foam
loss was reminiscent of a similar problem that doomed the space shuttle Columbia and its crew, and
marred Discovery's otherwise successful flight to the International Space
Station (ISS).
Engineers
may now decide to remove
PAL ramps altogether from an external tank to fuel NASA's next shuttle
launch, Discovery's STS-121 flight, set to fly no earlier than May
2006. A meeting to discuss the matter could be held next week, Hale told SPACE.com.
STS-114
pilot James Kelly said that while external tank foam debris was critical issue
before the flight, he and his crewmates were more interested in ensuring their
spacecraft's integrity.
"The most
critical thing for us as a crew was knowing the health
of our vehicle," Kelly said during the conference. "If you don't know there's
something to fix, it doesn't matter how well you can fix it."
NASA's
STS-114 flight carried a 50-foot (15-meter) boom
extension for the orbiter's robotic arm. Tipped with laser sensors and a
camera, the boom allowed Kelly and his fellow Discovery astronauts to scan the
orbiter's heat shield in flight and send the data down to engineers who later
cleared the shuttle for reentry.
Kelly said
the STS-114 crew did receive a good lesson in determining risk trade-offs while
preparing for Discovery's flight.
The lack of
a backup system to ensure that latches for stowage lockers remained closed
during launch required the use of tape to safe their doors, he said, adding
that the STS-114 crew also traded a series of exchanges with structural
analysts to develop contingency plans for securing a 600-pound (272-kilogram)
ISS gyroscope in Discovery's payload bay for return to Earth.
Kelly said
STS-114 mission managers did overrule Discovery's crew when it came to adding a
pair of heat shield repair tools on the orbiter's launch manifest. Two cure-in-place-ablative-applicators
(CIPAA), backpack-mounted tools designed to squirt a pink goo-like
material into damage tiles, rode aboard Discovery even though the repair method
itself was not ready for orbital testing.
"Our crew
never expected to have it onboard...[but] people did not
want to send us on orbit without something to save us, it was a very emotional
issue," Kelly said, adding that the important thing was that Discovery's
astronaut crew voiced their opinions. "Our concerns were noted and I think that
was a success story."