As part of on-going work in seek-and-hit space warfare -- termed "counterspace" in military parlance, China is expected to continue to enhance its satellite tracking and identification network.

"Beijings only current means of destroying or disabling a satellite, however, would be to launch a ballistic missile or space launch vehicle armed with a nuclear weapon. Such weapons, however, risk collateral damage to friendly space systems. According to press accounts, China can use probable low-energy lasers to blind the sensors on low-

Earth-orbiting satellites, although whether this claim extends to actual facilities is unclear," the DoD report notes.

The Pentagon assessment cites a Hong Kong newspaper article in January 2001 that reported China had developed and ground-tested and would soon begin space-testing an anti-satellite (ASAT) system described as a "parasitic microsatellite."

"This claim is being evaluated," the report says, adding that a number of nations, including China, are developing and proliferating microsatellite and nanosatellite technologies.

China is clearly working on, and plans to field, anti-satellites, the DoD study claims.

"Additional press reports and activities at several laser institutes suggest Beijing most likely will continue to pursue development of ground-based laser ASAT weapons and radars. China's current level of interest in laser technology suggests that it is reasonable to assume Beijing eventually could develop a weapon to destroy satellites."

In the military space arena, the newly issued DoD report contends that intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems "remains critical" to Beijing's military modernization program and supports the PLAs local wars doctrine. ISR is also most likely one of the primary drivers behind Beijings space endeavors, the DoD report says.

Identified by the DoD are Beijings ongoing space-based systems with potential military applications, hardware that includes two new remote-sensing satellites known as Ziyuan-1 and -2 -- the Chinese name for the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite. Launched in October 2003, Ziyuan-1B has an ability to resolve objects on Earth 62-feet (19 meters) in size.

The two Ziyuan-2 satellites probably also are capable of collecting digital imagery and have a sun synchronous orbit with worldwide coverage and near-real-time download of imagery of most of eastern Asia to potential ground sites in eastern and central China. Beijing also tested a new film-based imagery satellite in late 2003, the DoD report explains.

"China eventually can be expected to deploy advanced imagery, reconnaissance, and Earth resource systems with military applications. In the next decade, Beijing most likely will field radar and ocean surveillance satellites and also may deploy an improved film-based photoreconnaissance satellite," the report says. In the interim, the DoD adds, China probably will exploit commercial French, American, and Canadian remote sensing satellites, and various Russian satellite imagery systems.

Beijings exploitation of space and acquisition of related technologies remain high priorities in terms of improving its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance abilities.

China is placing major emphasis on improving space-based reconnaissance and surveillance, including electro-optical, synthetic-aperture radar, and other satellite reconnaissance systems. These systems, when fully deployed, are expected to provide a regional, and potentially hemispheric, continuous surveillance capability, the DoD report explains.

China has begun to embrace new satellite architecture emphasizing common satellite buses -- the basic hardware upon which sensors and other gear is attached. This approach to satellite construction is based on use of a standard, versatile satellite bus module, with minor modifications to accommodate various payloads.

In addition to domestic development, the DoD appraisal adds, China probably will continue to use commercial satellite imagery and may seek to join an international consortium-owned constellation.

The DoD review points out that China is cooperating with a number of countries, including Russia, Ukraine, Brazil, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy, to advance its objectives in space.

Chinas strategy for the developing world seeks to expand the scope and depth of its relationships, primarily as a means to secure access to natural resources and markets, but also to build influence and political support in multilateral bodies.

For example, the DoD cites one Chinese observer who points to Beijings work with Brazil for satellite technology and with India for computer software.

In addition to weapon components, Russia continues to cooperate with China for technical, design, and material support for numerous weapon and space systems.

Over the past decade, Russia has been the primary source of foreign military technology, although China has also benefited significantly from transfers and sales of defense and defense-related technologies from Israel, France, Germany, and Italy.

For the past 5 years China has sought to diversify its sources of foreign technology -- to include military technology -- in an effort to avoid over reliance on a single source for military technology and to reduce its dependence on the United States for dual-use and civilian technologies.

China is interested in electronic intelligence (ELINT) or signals intelligence (SIGINT) reconnaissance satellites.

"Although all of these digital data systems probably will be able to transmit directly to ground sites, China may be developing a system of data relay satellites to support global coverage," the DoD report states. Furthermore, Beijing has acquired mobile data reception equipment that could support more rapid data transmission to deployed military forces and units.

China is conducting extensive studies and is seeking foreign assistance on small satellites. They have already lofted a number of these satellites, including a scientific mission spacecraft, SJ-5 (Practice-5), in 1999 and an oceanographic research satellite, Haiyang (HY)-1 (Ocean-1), in 2002. At least two additional satellites in this series, HY-2 and -3, are expected in the future. Other missions for satellites of this class that Beijing eventually may field include Earth observation, communications, and navigation.

In the arena of microsatellites -- small spacecraft that tip the scales at a little over 200 pounds (100 kilograms) -- China is also developing this class of spacecraft for missions that include remote sensing and networks of electro-optical and radar satellites, the DoD report observes.

In this regard, the Pentagon points to a joint venture between China's Tsinghua University and Great Britains University of Surrey in building the "Tsinghua" system -- a constellation of seven mini-satellites with 164-feet (50-meter) resolution remote-sensing payloads. Russia launched the first satellite in June 2000. Later satellites in the series probably will have improved resolution.

PLA theorists and planners, the DoD report says, believe that future military campaigns will be conducted simultaneously on land, at sea, and in the air, space, and the electronic sphere. Therefore, the PLA is improving its joint operations capabilities by developing an integrated C4ISR network, a new command structure, and a joint logistics system.

In military lingo, C4ISR translates to Command, Control Communications, Computers (C4) Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). Such a command network allows rapid passing of orders and information up and down the chain of command and moving intelligence to decision-makers at the national and war zone levels.

"The PLA continues to upgrade its communication capabilities, which eventually will rival the most modern civil networks. Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) modernization and automation have been a PLA priority for nearly 25 years," the DoD report says. To improve this capability, China is "leveraging commercial information technologies to advance ambitious plans to create a high-technology electronic environment capable of supporting a modern military in both peace and wartime."

According to DoD, Chinas development and deployment of state-of-the-art ISR capabilities are uneven and will further complicate the PLAs ability to train in a realistic joint warfare environment and ultimately to fight a modern battle. "Currently targeting is a problem; however, with the emphasis on space-based imagery and reconnaissance satellites, this likely will improve over the next decade."

The Department of Defense report stresses that deciphering the decision-making behind Chinas military modernization is challenging, in large part because of the "extensive secrecy" surrounding Chinese security affairs and a "distinct aversion" to real transparency on the part of Chinas leaders.

"Chinas leaders continue to closely guard and resist public revelation of basic information, such as the full amount and distribution of government resources dedicated to national defense or, as witnessed in 2003, details on the origin and incidence of infectious disease."

While the full extent of Chinas defense expenditure is unknown, the DoD believes that Chinas total defense-related expenditures for 2003, "could be between $50 billion and $70 billion, making China the third largest defense spender in the world, after the United States and Russia, and by far the largest defense spender in Asia followed by Japan."

Electronic copies of the report are available at: