Overall, the team found that "significant errors in the formulation and execution of the Mars program were evident." The loss of the Mars 98 missions -- the Mars Climate Orbiter and the Mars Polar Lander -- can be tied to inadequate resources to accomplish the requirements.

Moreover, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), which managed the Mars missions, along with spacecraft-builder Lockheed Martin Astronautics, failed to ensure adequate, independent reviews and adherence to established policies and practices. Also, the interface between NASA headquarters and JPL was found to be "ineffective as a result of a failure to clearly communicate," the report said.

"The one thing that you can say is that NASA has had extraordinary success. NASA mostly does these things very well and does an outstanding job. In thisinstance, they just went too far in trying to do it with inadequate funding. That was the driving force in the Mars '98 failures."

Young noted that there was not enough margin or adequate funding for the Mars '98 missions. The result was that "riskgradually grew throughout the program," he said.

"We believe that some JPL and NASA headquarters organizational changes are necessary to successfully manage the future Mars program," Young said.

In other highlights:

• The Mars Polar Landers likely demise was the result of "spurious signals" generated when the landers legs were deployed during descent. Those signals led to a false indication that the craft had landed, prematurely shutting down the landers engines high above Mars. This resulted in the spacecraft crashing on the surface. While this scenario was found to be the "most probable failure cause," other problems that led to mission failure could not be ruled out. Lack of spacecraft telemetry during critical periods of its entry, descent and landing made it impossible to trace the exact failure problem.
• Failure of two associated Mars Deep Space 2 microprobes that were ejected from the lander was likely caused by a "deviation from fundamental management and engineering principles." In short, the report said, the microprobes "were not ready for launch." No most probable cause for the loss of the microprobes was identified, but the tiny devices were not adequately tested prior to liftoff.
• NASA, JPL and Lockheed Martin Astronautics have not completely made the transition to the "faster, better, cheaper" philosophy of space exploration. Project managers have their own, and sometimes-different interpretations of faster, better, cheaper. Crisp definitions for building econo-class spacecraft are needed.

Edward Weiler, NASA associate administrator for space science, said at the press conference that the two failures "are not a damnation" of the faster, better, cheaper concept. "The Mars Polar Lander and Mars Climate Orbiter were probably under-funded by about 30 percent," he said, reiterating a finding of the MPIAT group.

NASA headquarters will establish, in a sense, a Mars "slush fund." Monies are to be held in reserve for Mars spacecraft that run into technical difficulties. In recent years, such funds were not available, Weiler said. "That did not inspire a lot of communications. If you ran into trouble, you knew there was no more money. By establishing program reserves at NASA headquarters we will automatically inspire communications," he said.

Weiler said that NASA would fully respond to all of the MPIAT findings, noting that they fall into three areas: communications, training, as well as review and oversight. To this end, as reported by SPACE.com on March 27, a single point of authority for the Mars program at NASA headquarters is being established. Appointed to that post is Scott Hubbard from NASA's Ames Research Center, now associate director for astrobiology and space programs.

Other initiatives include risk management and team training at NASA, JPL and its industrial partners for better management of planetary missions, Weiler said. The space agency has begun working with the California Institute of Technology to make changes at JPL, to clearly articulate lines of authority, clarify roles and improve communications between all organizations involved.

Weiler cautioned that while such money reserves can act as a relief valve for troubled spacecraft managers, "it doesn't mean that we're going to be a blank check."

In general, the MPIAT observed that Mars exploration is an important national goal that should continue. The panel gave a thumbs-up to NASA decisions to proceed with a 2001 orbiter, and not to fly the 2001 lander, saving that hardware for a later opportunity.

As for future Mars planning, a new Mars architecture is now being blueprinted. Because this restructuring is now underway, the report stated that detailed evaluation of these plans is not currently feasible.

In conclusion, the study group found that "all identified flaws are correctable in a timely manner to allow a comprehensive Mars exploration program to successfully continue."

"The one thing that you can say is that NASA has had extraordinary success. NASA mostly does these things very well and does an outstanding job. In this instance, they just went too far in trying to do it with inadequate funding. That was the driving force in the Mars '98 failures," Young told SPACE.com.