I have been puzzled, since beginning work at NASA, by a statement that goes something like: "If we just had a president with the vision and foresight of John F. Kennedy to announce a bold space initiative, and to support that initiative, all would be well with NASA."

The assumption is that JFK's Apollo decision was the normative process in policy formulation and could and should be replicated by succeeding presidents.

At the time of the Apollo 11 landing, Mission Control in Houston flashed the words of President Kennedy announcing the Apollo commitment on its big screen. Those phrases were followed with this: "TASK ACCOMPLISHED, July 1969." No greater understatement could probably have been made. Any assessment of Apollo that does not recognize this technological achievement's political value is incomplete and inaccurate, for that was the primary goal of JFK's undertaking, and he undertook it mainly in reaction to political crisis.

In large measure because of its very appropriate response to Cold War problems, Apollo captured the American imagination and was met with strong political support. No one seemed concerned either about the difficulty or the expense at the time. Congressional debate was perfunctory, and NASA found itself literally pressing to expend the funds committed to it during the early 1960s.

Like many political decisions, at least in the U.S. experience, the decision to carry out Project Apollo was an effort to deal with an unsatisfactory situation -- world perception of Soviet leadership in space and technology. As such, Apollo was a remedial action ministering to a variety of political and emotional needs floating in the ether of world opinion. Apollo addressed these problems very well and was a worthwhile action if measured only in those terms. In announcing Project Apollo, Kennedy put the world on notice that the United States would not take a back seat to its superpower rival. As space policy analyst John M. Logsdon commented in 1979, "By entering the race with such a visible and dramatic commitment, the United States effectively undercut Soviet space spectaculars without doing much except announcing its intention to join the contest." Apollo was an effective symbol, just as intended.

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In the end a unique confluence of political necessity, personal commitment and activism, scientific and technological ability, economic prosperity and public mood made possible the 1961 decision to carry out a forward-looking lunar landing program. What perhaps should be suggested is that a complex web or system of ties among various people, institutions and interests allowed the Apollo decision. It then fell to NASA and other organizations of the federal government to accomplish the task set out in a few short paragraphs by President Kennedy in 1961.

Therefore, JFK's political decision to go to the Moon was an anomaly in science and technology policy making in Washington, and the Apollo program, while an enormous achievement, left a divided legacy for NASA and the aerospace community. The perceived "golden age" of Apollo created for the agency an expectation that the direction of any major space goal from the president would always bring NASA a broad consensus of support and provide it with the resources and license to dispense them as it saw fit.

Something most NASA officials did not understand at the time of the Moon landing in 1969, however, was that Apollo had not been conducted under normal political circumstances, and that the exceptional circumstances surrounding Apollo would not necessarily be repeated. The dilemma of the "golden age" of Apollo has been difficult to overcome, but moving beyond the Apollo program to embrace future opportunities must remain an important goal of the agency's leadership.

In some respects, Apollo reflected the peak of what some have called the "imperial presidency." This is the term often given to the aggrandizement of presidential power that came during the administrations of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon. It also prompted a number of commentators to criticize the ease with which chief executives overwhelmed other centers of power in the United States.

By the time of the Watergate affair, the expansion and abuse of presidential power relative to the Congress and courts had created a full-blown governmental crisis. Historians and political scientists like Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. decried the creation of the "imperial presidency" beginning in the mid 1970s and warned that deference to the president had upset the traditional system of checks and balances.

Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership (University of Illinois Press, 1997), that I co-edited with Howard E. McCurdy, contains essays on the presidents from Eisenhower to Bush and their space policy. These essays demark the contours of presidential power and its erosion as the "imperial presidency" shrank during the 1970s and 1980s. JFK stood at the pinnacle of the "imperial presidency" and was able to dictate a broad initiative in space exploration and to have other senior officials in the government accept that initiative with almost no debate and certainly with no perceived controversy.

Unique circumstances in early 1961 made it possible, because presidential power was heightened due to the Cold War crisis, for Kennedy to announce the Apollo decision. Perhaps the 1989 bold Space Exploration Initiative of President George Bush to go back to the Moon and on to Mars represented the trough of the "imperial presidency," when that proposal was rejected by political leaders and the American public.

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Accordingly, does this mean that those interested in a return to the Moon or human flights to Mars should look to other means for generating public interest and support? The answer is -- not entirely. Presidential leadership remains critical to any major public undertaking, but much more than that is needed. Very little can be accomplished in the public sector without at least the acquiescence of the White House, especially since the president is so effective in shaping policy agendas. So clearly that person must believe that whatever is proposed is a positive objective.

I once heard a senior staffer on Capitol Hill explain that the White House always shapes the national agenda, perhaps most effectively in the budget process, since any public undertaking requires funding. Congress may tinker around the edges. Individual members may alter certain parts of the budget to reflect their priorities. Outside organizations may convince policy makers to take away from one program or give to another. But except in rare situations, what results is a budget within a few percentage points of what the president originally proposed.

Absent some major crisis, recognized as such by leaders of all political persuasions, this process will be the norm. Therefore, advocates of an aggressive public effort in space must have presidential support for their initiatives.

In some respects we are talking about two different things in the current debate over space policy with a possible return to the Moon and/or a human mission to Mars. A return to the Moon might be comparatively straightforward at this stage in the Space Age. We have already done it with the Apollo program, and we know how to go about doing it again.

Dr. Roger D. Launius is the chief historian at NASA Headquarters in Washington, D.C.