Early in the Apollo program, a major problem was navigation to our destination and safe return. Dr. Charles Stark Draper of the MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Instrumentation Laboratory was given this job after expressing his confidence in a 1961 letter to a NASA official:

"I would like to volunteer for service as a crew member on the Apollo mission to the moon…. I am sure that our endeavors will lead to success…."

Now, that was accountability. NASA did not accept Dr. Draper’s offer, but he and hundreds of thousands of other Americans accepted accountability -- making possible Apollo 11 and five subsequent lunar landings.

This occurred almost 40 years ago. Today, much has changed. What has not changed is the need to set achievable goals, to chart out the means to accomplish them, and to accept accountability.

We must think beyond the next congressional appropriations hearing or corporate quarterly report to achieve our goals in space. We must clearly commit to a very specific and achievable goal or set of goals.

NASA, formed late in 1958, completed this process in less than three years, arriving at a well-considered engineering decision: We could responsibly undertake landing on the moon.

This engineering decision led to President Kennedy’s May 25, 1961 speech, announcing to the world we would land Americans on the moon and return them safely to Earth. He had been in office less than four months. The goals had been debated and engineering feasibility established before Kennedy took office.

Today, there are equally large issues:

1. What are the goals of the United States in space for the next 25 years and beyond?

2. What is the present and prospective effectiveness of our space organizations in achieving these goals?

3. What alternative institutional arrangements may better meet these goals?

Military, civil-government and commercial space are changing. They are intertwined, and will become increasingly so. Neither goals nor navigation of these three sectors can be effectively addressed in isolation.

Recent strategic plans by NASA and the Defense Department tend to lack explicit, doable goals and deadlines for their achievement. Strategy seems to be "steady as she goes," and to petition for rising annual budgets.

We must think beyond the next congressional appropriations hearing or corporate quarterly report to achieve our goals in space.
     

There may be unfortunate parochialism and isolation among the federal agencies involved in space. NASA focuses on civil projects, the Federal Aviation Administration deals with commercial issues, and the Air Force is oriented toward military objectives. None appears to have much concern with needs other than its own.

When agencies or panels review "what went wrong" in space, they often assign blame to "lack of funding." This indicates to me a lack of the accountability that led to success in space during the Apollo era. What has gone wrong in recent years may be the lack, at the "front end" of the planning process, of well-considered engineering decisions about what goals are possible -- and, once they are set, the dedication to "make it happen."

We must overcome the bureaucratic fear of losing power, cease counterproductive, intramural resistance to change and pull away from short-term thinking. We must terminate unsuccessful endeavors without delay.

A broad review of our space policy is needed, so the incoming administration and Congress can implement measures early in the new president's term to improve our national and economic security through space. I believe profound changes will be found necessary, regardless of which party is elected.