Aside from being of academic interest, what practical significance does a record for continuous longevity have for governmental effectiveness? The case of James Webb, Goldins predecessor, suggests it matters a great deal [W. Henry Lambright, Powering Apollo: James E. Webb of NASA (Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins, 1995]. What is at issue is the capacity of an Administrator to put his stamp on an agency through changes made in what he inherits. This is done through "new programs or other significant innovations" with which the executive is "personally involved" [Jameson Doig and Erwin Hargrove, eds, Leadership and Innovation: Entrepreneurs in Government (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins, 1990) p.5].

For Webb, the key program was Apollo. While President Kennedy made the ultimate decision to go to the Moon in 1961, Webb was active in shaping that decision and then had to implement it over the rest of the decade. Webb made a sequence of decisions over his span at NASA that propelled and protected Apollo. His greatest test came in 1967 at the time of the Apollo fire, when three astronauts were killed. This was a time of turmoil in the nation, because of Vietnam War protests and civil rights unrest. Conservatives in Congress wanted to divert space dollars to the war; liberals wished to put the same funds in the cities in the name of the Great Society. In the wake of the fire disaster, Apollo could very easily have come undone had Webb not used his considerable political and managerial skills to navigate NASA through the crisis. By 1968, NASA was back on track toward its goal, although Webb, in defending his agency, had expended much of the political capital he had accumulated over the 1960s.

A lengthy administrative tenure has downsides as well as upsides. Webb saw Apollo and NASA as an engine for positive change in United States society. He envisioned a "space age America," catalyzed by NASA investment in universities and technological innovation [Walter McDougall, . . . the Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (NY: Basic Books, 1985, ch. 18)]. Webbs philosophy was, "If we can go to the moon, why cant we. . .". He harangued university presidents and business leaders all across the country to join him in a crusade to use space technology to raise the spirit and performance of the U.S. However, he served long enough to see his effort (the core of which was called Sustaining University Program SUP) fall far short of his objectives.

Near the end of his tenure, Webb curtailed SUP and much else in NASA. With funds declining, he concentrated NASA money and his personal energies on Apollo. In the end, Webb sacrificed himself, leaving earlier than necessary to make sure his deputy, Tom Paine, would be at NASAs helm when the new President, Richard Nixon, took over in 1969. His believed that Nixon would leave NASA intact, at least through the first Apollo landing, if an apolitical acting administrator were in charge. Webbs strategy worked, and the Apollo goal was achieved in July, 1969. But the man who managed America to the moon was on the sidelines when that extraordinary feat was accomplished.

The lessons for longevity from the Webb years are several. First, to accomplish great deeds in government takes time, and the longer the leader is personally involved in devising, nurturing, and protecting innovative programs, the more likely they will succeed. Second, a leader who stays long enough will inevitably see failure as well as success in program innovation. Third, how a leader chooses to leave can help or hurt the program most important to him; and fourth, given electoral reality, it is rare indeed that even a long-duration administrator who launches or significantly modifies a great program will be in office to see it completed.

W. Henry Lambright is Political Science and Public Administration Director of the Center for Environmental Policy and Administration at the Maxwell School of Citizenship & Public Affairs, Syracuse University