Though it had its critics, it turns out the program's $100 million cost was well spent.

NASA managers originally hadn't planned on such extensive tests of station parts. They believed if contractors followed their specifications, each part could be assembled in space with minimum testing and risk.

Originally, end-to-end testing proposed by Boeing, the prime contractor for Alpha, was rejected. NASA Administrator Dan Goldin said the Boeing proposal was too expensive. Later, less extensive testing was proposed, but a completely integrated test wasn't planned until the Russian delay created time.

"There really wasn't an opportunity," said Tip Talone, director of space station and shuttle payload processing. "Basically the elements came to Kennedy Space Center and they were to be launched with only a minimum amount of testing here."

"As we went forward with the program there began to be some schedule slips, the gap started opening up."

It was in January 1997 that then 34-year-old Scott Chandler and a team of young engineers learned components under construction by the Russian partners were running late. Soon, American space station segments would begin to back up at KSC.

With Talone's support, they told then-space station program manager Randy Brinkley that the Russian delays would give NASA time to test the first six mission components all together.

He said a team of NASA workers could complete the job for about half of what it would cost prime contractor Boeing. Still, the first phase of testing would cost about $36 million.

Safety first

Chandler, now 39 and program manager of the component-testing program, said the key to a mock-station rests largely in the electrical power. The station runs from a single power source. Each new component draws more power, with each system depending on the next.

Chandler, a soft-spoken, red-haired Titusville resident, said it was a mistake to perform testing with just one or two parts connected, as NASA originally planned.

But other NASA managers, including Brinkley, were concerned about how such an extensive testing program would affect costs and shuttle-launch schedules. Goldin insists launch timetables played no part in the decision to test the space station parts.

"I don't agree with that. You are saying NASA would have launched things that were flawed just to launch on schedule," Goldin said during an interview with FLORIDA TODAY.

In 1994 and 1995, Goldin asked Boeing to propose an integrated test, but the company came up with a plan Goldin said was too extensive and expensive. "We don't want to compromise safety or hardware in the human spaceflight program," said Joe Mills, a Boeing vice president and deputy program manager for the space station. "In any one of these areas you can have technical arguments about what is acceptable. . . .We put together a program that is low risk already. In some cases, (NASA and Boeing) agree to disagree."

Money was earmarked in the budget for some level of integrated test. What kind of test and how extensive had not been established, Goldin said.

"It would be a cold day in hell if I would allow them to launch something" without proper testing, Goldin said.

But Talone, who Goldin referred to as a "national resource," said it was difficult to convince everyone in the project that extensive testing was necessary. He and his team, including Chandler, had to convince more than just Brinkley that it was a good idea.