WASHINGTON, DC Eighty seconds. It's not much time in the life of a space program. But on Monday that is how long it took the H-II launch vehicle to rise from its pad at Tanegashima Space Center and then tear itself to pieces 28 miles above the western Pacific Ocean, establishing yet another roadblock in the development of Japan's commercial space industry.

While the loss of the booster and satellite was costly and inconvenient, the disaster's greatest impact could be the shadow cast on the Japanese aerospace industry's level of maturity and technological development. How, and when, will Japan confidently enter the marketplace for commercial space transportation services?

By 1970, Japan launched its first satellite into orbit following a limited space program that began in the 1960s. The stable of launchers that were available to the country to launch its first satellites was all U.S. built vehicles. When Japan constructed its first launch facilities, the generation of vehicles that flew from the island site were all based on U.S. Delta rocket designs.

Their first launch vehicle, called the N-I, made its maiden launch in Sept. 1975; the larger N-II flew first in Feb. 1981. The N series as well as the larger H-I that followed were still made up primarily of components from the U.S. with only a few systems from the nascent Japanese space industry. If Japan was to emerge as a regional space power in Asia, and a global technological force, then a larger launcher was required-one that would be, for the first time, designed and built completely by Japanese industry in Japanese factories. A rocket upon which a generation of new Japanese satellites and payloads could be designed.

It took a decade for that rocket to emerge. Following a 1984 government decision, the shape of a wholly new type of booster began to emerge. While the N-II and H-I series were closely related in configuration and capability, the H-II was substantially larger and more complicated than anything that had flown before from Japan was. A core liquid rocket would burn super-cold liquid hydrogen like the engines used on the American space shuttle. Two huge strap-on all solid boosters would flank that core, much like the Frenchs plans for the Ariane 5 and the U.S. Titan IV. The design of the hydrogen engine to power the core, the LE-7, would be a peer competitor to engines built by French and American rocket engine makers, which had many more years of flight experience than Japan. The H-II and its systems would be bold leaps for the Japanese space program.

Japanese engineers pointed out that the H-II weighs 260 tons and could lift a two-ton satellite to geostationary orbit. By contrast the French Ariane 4 weighs 460 tons to lift a 2.3 ton payload to GTO. The Russian Proton weighs 770 tons, but according to Japanese documents can orbit only 2.4 tons. Whats the technological edge? To lift the same weight to orbit as the H-II, other nations require rockets two to three times as big as the Japanese vehicle.

But the H-II faced hurdles unique to Japan. Unlike the U.S., Japan divided its space agency into two parts. The National Space Development Agency (NASDA) conducted engineering and hardware development while a second element, called ISAS conducted scientific space research. Both programs had to make due with far less government funding than was enjoyed by other space powers. While the U.S. NASA spent on average more than $13 billion a year for its space projects, Japans combined programs had but $2 billion to work with. The tight budgets left precious little room for developmental ills.

The H-II, like nearly every other launch vehicle ever built, had setbacks and delays along the path to its first flights. There were gaseous hydrogen leaks. One rocket engine under development blew up in 1991, killing an engineer. There were other delays while rocket engines, stages, and systems were modified and tested anew. Finally on February 3, 1994 two years behind schedule the first H-II was successfully launched. There were five additional H-II launches leading to Mondays failure. On the August 1994 second flight an upper stage "kick" motor malfunctioned. On the rockets 6^th flight in February 1998 the second stage shutdown 44 seconds early, sending the COMETS satellite into a lower orbit. An eighth and final booster, vehicle no. 7, was planned for launch next year carrying the MDS-1 spacecraft and a tracking satellite. It, too, had been delayed; changing the sequence of the final H-II launches.

Mondays failure marked the first time the LE-7 engine had a serious malfunction. It was also the first time in the history of the Japanese space program that a rocket blew up in flight, and the first time a Japanese engineer had to send the distruct command to a launch vehicle. Vehicle no. 8 was also the next-to-last flight of the basic H-II. While a major technological break-through for Japans program, the rocket became vastly expensive to build and fly.

Costly boosters limit the funding available to build satellites. But the expense of the H-II also blocked Japanese government plans to commercialize the rocket, offering it for sale on the worlds launch market. A commercial company was established in the early 1990s to try and sell the rockets. But with a pricetag near $190 million each, the launcher was several times more expensive than its competitors such as the Ariane, Proton, Delta III, and Atlas boosters. Japan, while serious about building its own fleet of science and research satellites dependent upon the H-II, also wanted a commercially viable launch vehicle to sell to the world.

In 1995 the Japanese government began the development of the H-IIA rocket, to replace the expensive H-II. This newer launcher would be developed in two phases. The first version would look much like the current H-II. But the new vehicle would cost substantially less to build, would feature advanced manufacturing techniques and simplified onboard systems. Costing less to build, Japan could offer the rocket commercially at a price closer to its global competition. But the second phase of the H-IIA would be as revolutionary a step as the original H-II was over the rockets of the 1980s. The two solid boosters would be replaced with a single large liquid booster with a more advanced rocket engine, the LE-7A.

The new rocket would nearly double the lifting capability of the H-II. And would also include automated health maintenance systems and a simplified, shorter countdown and pre-launch checkout. Before Mondays launch failure, the first II-A Phase I vehicle was set for launch next February carrying a satellite for Europe, with a second launch later in the year. The last H-II was to fly between these newer versions in a gradual phase out. The II-A Phase II rockets were to begin flight trials in November 2001.

The effect of Mondays accident may slow these development programs into the middle of the next decade. While the cause of the failure is not yet known, the launch had been plagued by repeated delays with the engine and related systems. The test program for the H-IIA engine has also suffered delays. Could Japan be pushing space launch modernization too hard given its available funding?

So what does a difference of a year or two in the beginning of these newer rocket flights make? Why should the West care? At about the same time the H-IIA was under design, the U.S. began the design of a whole new family of launcher. Called the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV), this modern rocket system is to enter service in 2001, become operational in 2002, and replace the existing U.S. Delta III, Atlas, and Titan boosters.

While developed with U.S. Air Force funding, the EELV is to be a commercial rocket. The H-IIA and the EELV fleet are to enter service at about the same time, and in a head-to-head competition the difference in a year or two in availability might mean the loss of significant satellite customers. The Ariane 5 and Proton marketers will feel that same competitive pressure. Chinas Long March rockets may face stiffer competition if the H-IIA were available, since many satellite makers are only choosing the Chinese launcher because of the lack of other available rockets in the same weight-lifting class.

So any major delay in bringing the H-IIA to market, or complete the remaining H-II series would not only help the competition- but also make it even more difficult for Japan to realize its dream of full commercial space autonomy.