7. What needs to be fixed before the shuttle can fly again?

As one senior shuttle manager has explained, there will be three "buckets of work" that will come out of the Columbia board report.

The first will include all of those tasks that must be done before the shuttle can start flying again. The second will include those tasks that must be done as soon as possible, but are not a constraint to flight. The third bucket will hold those jobs that must be done when the technology can be developed and worked into the schedule.

The difficult job will be to make sure that first bucket doesn't get too full. Some lawmakers who are less willing to accept the inherent risks of spaceflight may want to load up the first bucket so full that NASA won't get another shuttle off the ground for years. That would be a tragedy as bad as Columbia and Challenger disasters combined.

Both the Columbia board and NASA managers have said they see nothing that should preclude the shuttle from safely returning to flight within the next six to nine months. We're still betting on seeing the next shuttle mission fly around Easter 2004.

We agree that the first bucket should include the jobs the board has already announced -- detailed on the next page -- as well as putting in place changes to the way NASA manages safety. The agency needs to assemble a team of experts who will study issues like in flight anomalies and problem reports during ground processing. Their job is to see if there is a pattern that's telling a bigger story.

NASA officials are fond of saying "We have to convince ourselves it's safe to fly." That phrase should be eliminated from the space program because its meaning can go both ways. Shuttle program officials convinced themselves it was safe to fly even though shedding foam and damaged tiles were a problem seen on dozens of previous flights.

A more specific list of fixes with detailed explanations was recently presented in Florida Today's outstanding series of reports called "Seven Fixes Needed for Return to Flight."

That list included reducing the number of safety waivers, minimizing risk from foam, improving agency communications, developing an in-flight repair plan, track safety problems better, make sure the right work force is in place, and consider different re-entry paths to avoid flying over large populations.

We agree with all of them except the final one -- a debate that can be held another time.

Next page: Early orders.