WASHINGTON -- In a town that thrives on paperwork, NASA now has no less than six reports from special independent review boards to wade through in planning its future.

Since last fall, the agency has been deluged with reports that cover everything from space shuttle maintenance and failed Mars probes to the agency's philosophy of flying "faster, better, cheaper" missions.

That’s over and above the half dozen or so separate reports NASA has received since January from its Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, the National Academy of Sciences and the General Accounting Office. All of those groups regularly weigh in on the space agency's performance.

• November 10: Part one of the Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap Investigation Board, led by Marshall Space Flight Center director, Art Stephenson. That report looked at the reason the Climate Orbiter was lost on September 23 as it maneuvered into position to circle the planet. As it turned out, engineers at Lockheed Martin, where the probe was built, failed to convert English measurements into metric so controllers at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) could accurately plot a trajectory. The report also warned that the upcoming Mars Polar Lander might encounter trouble at Mars unless NASA took corrective steps.
• March 9: Shuttle Independent Assessment Team, led by Ames Research Center director, Henry McDonald. That report investigated space shuttle processing and maintenance issues and found an alarming lack of NASA oversight. McDonald's team recommended sweeping management changes, along with hiring more NASA inspectors to improve shuttle safety.
• March 13: Part two of Stephenson's Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap Investigation Board. That report criticized NASA for putting too much emphasis on cost and schedule reduction, and concluded the agency was taking unacceptable risks in its programs.
• March 13: Faster, Better, Cheaper report by former JPL project manager Anthony Spear. That one-man report also took the agency to task for going much too fast on its programs and sacrificing success for cost.
• March 28: Mars Program Independent Assessment Team, led by former Lockheed Martin executive Thomas Young. That report found the Mars exploration program to be lacking in experienced managers, a test and verification program and adequate safety margins.
• March 28: Mars Polar Lander Failure Review Board, chaired by former JPL flight operations chief, John Casani. That report found that the Mars Polar Lander probably failed on December 3 because its engine shut down too early. More training, more management and better oversight could have caught the problem.

You might think NASA would be drowning in material by now, but there must be more room on its bookshelves. The agency plans to issue its own report -- one that embraces the recommendations from all the rest -- sometime around the middle of this summer.